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NOTES
ever, dealt not with the application of the fifth amendment to
state proceedings, but rather with the extension of state-granted
privileges to protect witnesses who were in imminent danger of
prosecution in other jurisdictions. 15 Since the Louisiana privi-
lege admittedly could not be applied in the instant case, the cited
cases have no application. The decision in the instant case, there-
fore, seems to be without precedent in the jurisprudence of this
state. Although the court did not expressly state that the privi-
lege afforded by the fifth amendment may be generally ap-
plicable to proceedings of the Louisiana courts, the recognition
of the federal privilege where the similar privilege afforded by
the Louisiana Constitution has been expressly withdrawn seems
to present strong support for this conclusion. The result of the
instant case is to render ineffective the exception provided in
the Louisiana Constitution relating to bribery cases and to
permit invocation of the fifth amendment to the United States
Constitution whenever a witness stands indicted in a federal
court. Although a repetition of the facts of the instant case
would be fortuitous, the decision does seem to indicate that our
court has taken a far more liberal attitude than has been taken
by the courts of the federal and other state systems.
Robert J. Jones
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - LEGALIZED
GAMBLING - LOUISIANA STATE RACING COMMISSION
The Louisiana State Racing Commission granted Magnolia
Park, Inc., permission to conduct harness racing in Jefferson
Parish and licensed it to conduct pari-mutuel wagering as part
of the operation of the track. Plaintiffs, property owners in Jef-
ferson Parish, brought suit to force revocation of the license and
to obtain temporary and permanent injunctions prohibiting the
pari-mutuel wagering. They alleged that the statutes which
15. People v. Denuyl dealt with the application of MICH. CONST. art. 2, § 16,
and expressly stated that the opinion assumed that "the Fifth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution . . . does not apply to prosecution under State Laws."
Mitchell v. Kelley applied FLA. CONST. § 12 (declaration of rights). State ex rel.
Doran v. Doran applied only LA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
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empower the Commission to license wagering' are violative of
the constitutional mandate that the Legislature shall pass laws
to suppress gambling. 2 They further alleged that since the op-
eration of the track is unconstitutional, it constitutes a nuisance
per se. The district court dismissed the case as of nonsuit. On
appeal, held, affirmed. The constitutional provision declaring
gambling to be a vice is not self-operative and vests in the Leg-
islature the full discretion as to the manner in which gambling
shall be prohibited or permitted. The laws creating the Racing
Commission and expressly legalizing pari-mutuel betting are con-
stitutional. Therefore, operation of the track is lawful and is
not a nuisance per se.3 Gandolfo v. Louisiana State Racing Com-
mission, 227 La. 45, 78 So.2d 504 (1954).
Article XIX, section 8, of the Louisiana Constitution pro-
vides that "gambling is a vice and the Legislature shall pass
laws to suppress it." This constitutional mandate has been held
not to be self-executing and as merely delegating to the Legis-
lature the exclusive power to pass laws making gambling a
crime.4 Gambling has therefore been held to be a crime only
where it has been specifically condemned by the Legislature.5
The word "suppress," as used in the constitutional provision, has
been defined in one case as "equivalent to prohibit, put down,
or end by force." In that case the court stated that "the Legis-
lature might not license any sort of gambling." In another case,
in dicta, the court stated that "it is not possible under the Con-
stitution and laws of this State to license gambling as a lawful
1. LA. R.S. 4:148, 153, 156, 159 (1950). LA. R.S. 4:148 (1950) provides: "The
commission may prescribe rules and regulations under which shall be conducted all
horse races upon the results of which there is wagering. The commission shall
make rules governing, permitting, and regulating the wagering on horse races under
the form of mutuel wagering by patrons, known as the 'pari-mutuel wagering' and
the 'book-making form of wagering,' both of which methods are legal. Only those
persons receiving a license from the commission may conduct these types of wager-
ing, and shall restrict these forms of wagering to a space within the race meeting
grounds. All other forms of wagering on the result of horse races are illegal, and
all wagering on horse races outside the enclosure where horse races have been
licensed by the commission is illegal." (Emphasis added.)
2. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 8(1).
3. The court also held that the laws were not violative of the constitutional
prohibition against lotteries found in LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 8(3). This seems
to be correct because factors other than chance determine the winner of a horse
race.
4. Shreveport v. Maloney, 107 La. 193, 31 So. 702 (1902).
5. State v. Mustachia, 152 La. 821, 94 So. 408 (1922) ; State v. Austin, 142
La. 384, 76 So. 809 (1917) ; State v. Scheffield, 123 La. 271, 48 So. 932 (1909)
Talbot v. Truxillo, La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 27,326, 1925 (unreported).
6. State v. Mustachia, 152 La. 821, 824, 94 So. 408, 409 (1922).
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occupation."' 7 Horse racing bets have been enforced in two court
of appeal cases8 on the basis of article 2983 of the Civil Code,'
but the validity of that article was not contested in either case.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court stated that it was merely
reaffirming "our previous rulings that the provision in ... the
Constitution ... is not self-operative, that there is delegated to
the Legislature, and to the Legislature alone, the power to sup-
press gambling, and to determine how, when, where, and in what
respects gambling shall be prohibited or permitted."'10 (Emphasis
added.) In doing so, the court apparently felt that its previous
decisions had in effect recognized that the Legislature possessed
the power to legalize certain types of gambling if it desired to
do so, despite the constitutional provision ordering it to suppress
gambling. It is submitted that none of the cases relied upon by
the court stand for the proposition that the Legislature may
legalize pari-mutuel betting on horse races. It is further sub-
mitted that the decision in the instant case does violence to the
constitutional mandate that the Legislature shall pass laws to
suppress gambling.
Analysis of the decision in the instant case seems to indicate
that in delegating to the Legislature the right to determine the
meaning and scope of .the constitutional mandate, the court re-
jected its traditional duty of judicial review." The court seemed
to feel that since the mandate is not self-executing the Legisla-
ture has complete freedom to enact any law on the subject of
gambling, whether suppressing or permitting it. However, it
would seem that the result of the non-self-executing feature of
the mandate should be merely that there is no enforceable law
on the subject until the Legislature acts. 12 When the Legislature
7. State v. Barbee, 187 La. 529, 551, 175 So. 50, 57 (1937).
8. Mehle v. McLean, 139 So. 681 (La. App. 1932) ; Bain v. Grillot, 6 La. App.
825 (1927).
9. LA. CIVM CODE art. 2983 (1870) : "The law grants no action for the pay-
ment of what has been won at gaming or by a bet, except for games tending to
promote skill in the use of arms, such as the exercise of the gun and foot, horse
and chariot racing.. ..
10. Gandolfo v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, 227 La. 45, 71, 78 So.2d
504, 514 (1954).
11. In Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803), Chief Justice
John Marshall spoke of judicial review as being "the very essence of judicial duty."
12. The cases relied on by the court in the instant case (see notes 5, 6, and
7 supra) are authority for the limited propositions that only the Legislature may
pass laws suppressing gambling and that gambling is a crime only when defined
as such by the Legislature. While the provision is not self-operative and the
court could not mandamus the Legislature to pass laws suppressing gambling, this
does not exclude the legislation concerning gambling from judicial scrutiny to
determine its validity.
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does pads a law on the subject, it then becomes the duty of the
court to determine whether that law is in harmony with or
repugnant to the constitutional provision.13 It is suggested that
the real issue in the instant case was whether or not the con-
stitutional mandate that the Legislature shall pass laws sup-
pressing gambling carries with it the negative implication that
they shall not pass laws permitting it. In their dissenting opin-
ions Justices Hawthorne 14 and Hamiter" took the latter posi-
tion in contending that any law permitting, licensing, or legal-
izing gambling is unconstitutional as violative of the mandate.
However, the majority of the court was unwilling to decide this
issue, and delegated to the Legislature the right of determining
the effect of the mandate. 16 It is submitted that this abdication
to the Legislature of the court's function of determining the
meaning and scope of the Constitution is a refusal on the part of
the Supreme Court to accept its duty of determining the validity
of statutes by comparing them with the applicable provisions of
the Constitution.
Edwin L. Blewer, Jr.
EVIDENCE - PRIVILEGE AGAINST DISCLOSURE OF
IDENTITIES OF INFORMERS
Defendant, chief investigator of a committee created by the
New Orleans Commission Council to investigate the police de-
partment of that city, was asked by a grand jury to disclose the
names of certain informers whom he had identified by numbers
and fictitious names in a report to it. Defendant refused to re-
veal the names, claiming that since the information was given
to him contingent on full assurance to the informers that their
names would not be disclosed, he was privileged to refuse to
name them. He relied in part on a policy memorandum of the
committee which authorized the withholding of names of in-
formers where to do so would not critically hamper the com-
mittee's work. Upon direction by the trial court to identify the
informers, he was adjudged guilty of contempt for refusal to do
13. State v. Mustachia, 152 La. 821, 94 So. 408 (1922), held that La. Acts
1920, No. 127, p. 185, defining what betting on horse races was criminal, was not
a special law in violation of LA. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
14. Gandolfo v. Louisiana State Racing Commission, 227 La. 45, 80, 78 So.2d
504, 514 (1954).
15. Id. at 74, 78 So.2d at 517.
16. Id. at 71, 78 So.2d at 515.
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